Week 10 Handout

Traditional Account:

*Semantic* ***status*** *of claimables:*  True/not-True

*Persons’* ***attitudes*** *towards claimables:* Taking-true/Taking not-True

*Semantic* ***content*** *of claimables defined by*:  Truth conditions

So attitudes and content defined by the basic status: truth.

*MIE* has *two* elements for each item that tradition has *one* for: status, attitude, and content.

Status is *person*- or *interlocutor*-relative.

MIE Account:

*Semantic* ***status*** *of claimables:* Committed/not Entitled/not

*Persons’* ***attitudes*** *towards claimables:* Attribute status Acknowledge status

*Claimables semantically defined by*: Circumstances Consequences

This last is inferentialism.

These yield an 8-fold botanization, of, e.g., circumstances licensing attribution of an entitlement to *p*, or consequences of acknowledging a commitment to *p*.

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  Circs UpstreamConsDownstream | **Commitment** | **Entitlement** |
| **Attributed** |  |  |
| **Acknowledged** |  |  |

1. The social-perspectival distinction between attitudes of attributing and acknowledging: is appealed to in
2. Understanding the role of the **truth** condition in the deontic scorekeeping version of the JTB account of knowledge attribution.
3. Explaining propositional attitude ascriptions. In asserting an ascription one is doing two things: *attributing* one commitment and *acknowledging* another.
4. *Semantically*,according to inferentialism, the *content* of any claim is a matter of its inferential role, and what follows from and is evidence for or against a claim depends on the inferential context of collaterial premises (auxiliary hypotheses) one conjoins it with to extract them.

In the case of the content of the ascrib*ed* claim, there are two candidates: collateral commitments of the ascrib*ee* and collateral commitments of the ascrib*er*. That is, one can use either collateral commitments that are *attributed* or those that are *acknowledged*.

1. This difference is now made explicit in the ‘of’/’that’ regimentation of *de dicto/de re*. And we see that we can use different backgrounds for different parts of the ascribed claim.
2. This explicit ascriptional expression of the distinction of social perspective between attitudes of attributing and acknowledging statuses is the home language-game of **representational** idioms, which express it.
3. This is the connection between truth and representation.
4. Further, *anaphora* (a further structure in the ISA—inference, substitution, anaphora—semantic structure) plays an essential role: the interpersonal anaphora between ascribee and ascriber is reflected and expressed in the intrasentential ascription-structural anaphora.
5. Note how prosentential account uses anaphora to solve *Frege-Geach embedding problem*. "That's interesting--and it's true.". Are agreeing (that is what one is *doing*), but embeddable content (if that's true...), what one is *saying*, is inherited from anaphoric antecedent.
6. The distinction of two *statuses*, commitment and entitlement:
7. Is needed for anyting recognizable as a practice of giving and asking for reasons.
8. Underwrites 3 kinds of broadly inferential relations among claimables.
9. As interlocutor-relative (dialogical, not monological), raise the question whether claims are given content that is about how things are, not about who is committed or entitled to what.
10. Can *prove* that content articulated in terms of these statuses does not collapse to content concerning attitudes or statuses. These are the **Objectivity Proofs**.

Can appeal to incompatibilities, or to commitment consequences. These distinguish the contents of OED non-ascriptional claims from the contents of *any* ascriptions specifying what *anyone* or *everyone* is committed or entitled to. Contra Peirce and Wright, or Rortyan pragmatism.

***Epistemically strong de re beliefs*, as opposed to *denotationally* *de re ascriptions*:**

Here there are two principle phenomena:

1. The modal rigidity that distinguishes the use of proper names from that of definite descriptions; and
2. The “essential indexical” argument of Perry, Lewis, and Anscombe.
3. Modal rigidity is an anaphoric phenomenon.
4. Obama is the 44th President. He might not have been the 44th President, but it is not possible that *he*, Obama, that very man, not have been (identical to) Obama.

Anaphoric chains that cross in and out of modal contexts. (Cf. “quantifying in”)

1. Kaplan’s “dthat” operator as a modal rigidifier.

It is possible that dthat(ιxDx) ≠ ιxDx.

“dthat” forms anaphoric dependents of anaphorically intitiating tokenings of the type it is applied to.

1. The “essential indexical” argument turns on non-intersubstitutability of indexicals with any non-indexical expressions in epistemic modal contexts. Indexicals are shown to play a unique *epistemic* and *motivational* role.
2. Kaplan: “I am making a mess on the grocery floor.” “I am about to be eaten by a bear.”

Anscombe: immunity from errors of mis-identification, and non-observational knowledge of our own doings.

1. Anscombe’s ‘A’ language.
2. Building an ‘I’ analog from Anscombe’s ‘A’, in stages.